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Centring on a lone woman whose “quest for creative revelation [results 
in] death” (Mercer 108), A State of Siege (1966) has so far proven ob-
durately resistant to any attempts at attenuating its bleakness. The pre-
vailing critical consensus concerning Janet Frame’s sixth novel indeed is 
that it represents a “culmination of despair” (Delrez, “Eye of the Storm” 
126) in the author’s career. It is possibly related that, as Marc Delrez 
argues, “the novel supports, if only at the level of metaphor,” the view 
that the main protagonist, an amateur painter who retires to the island 
of Karemoana to seek some artistic and social independence, “dies to 
her long-harboured vision of the world, concomitantly with the onset 
of the quest” (130). Concurring that “death is foreshadowed from the 
time of Malfred’s arrival on the island,” Judith Dell Panny observes that 
“the bach she moves into is described as a ‘deceased estate’, where she 
is ‘alone, in charge and at rest’” (91). Dell Panny’s impression that the 
words ‘at rest’ have an “ominous ring” as they are “familiar on tomb-
stones” (91) is surely not attenuated by Delrez’s reflection that the task 
of carrying the luggage for travellers such as Malfred Signal falls “rather 
ominously [on] the undertakers of the island” (“The Eye of the Storm” 
131). Capitalizing on the notion that Malfred is already dead when she 
sets out to explore her “New View” (State 10), I argue that, in fact, the 
Tibetan Book of the Dead forms the backdrop to A State of Siege and 
that an awareness of this intertext potentially sheds new light on the 
much discussed, yet still tantalizingly mysterious, topic of an after-life 
in Frame’s work. My analysis will show that “nothingness of identity” 
(Delrez, Manifold Utopia 133) is not meant to translate into “a shape 
beyond dissolution” (99) and, if a shape exists, that it is one that pos-
sesses in fine no self-essence, no “core of distinction” (194), but an ac-
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cretion of emptiness. In contrast to exclusionary shapes which, artistic 
as they may be, entrench all sorts of dualisms, “empty shapes,” as Frame 
calls them in The Edge of the Alphabet (269), allow a free circulation be-
tween inside and outside, the living and the dead, the self and the world. 
Such extreme porousness, appropriately enough, is not simply a char-
acteristic of the author’s alternative aesthetic. For instance, when Zoe, a 
character in Edge, declares, “let us be empty shapes of people” (269), she 
suggests that emptiness is at the heart of an authentic condition of both 
being and memory, since it is only when Zoe’s own ontological barriers 
are dissolved that she is able to commemorate the dead (Edge 133). To 
arrive at the dead, then, it is not sufficient to die; one must also become 
akin to an empty shape, albeit a deceased one. 
This certainly validates Delrez’s statement that “Frame typically tack-
les immortality as a form of being that bypasses the strictures of the 
thinking/dreaming ego” (Manifold Utopia 133) although, in his view, to 
survive is to be remembered by someone else, preferably an artist, who 
has yet to face his or her own merging into the undifferentiated whole. 
A State of Siege, however, may well suggest that it is quite impossible 
to apprehend the world and truly see other selves just as they are (or 
were) in a state of non-dissolution—that is, so long as the self-world 
dualism is maintained. Therefore, I do not think it is a mistake to ap-
proach the Framean after-life “with an eye on the fate of the individual 
consciousness” (Delrez, Manifold Utopia 133), for only then can we 
consider knowledge (including memory and sensual perceptions) and 
nothingness of identity—or, to use the Buddhist terminology, a non-
dual condition of being—as two facets of the same coin. Likewise, if, as 
Delrez maintains, the role of the artist is to salvage lost memories and if, 
as I argue, dissolution is a prerequisite to genuine commemoration, one 
wonders to what extent the final breaching of Malfred’s fortress of self is 
an attempt to halt her search for the New View, or if it is itself constitu-
tive of the New View.
Thus, although critics such as Delrez, Patrick Evans (150), Ruth 
Brown (49), and Carole Ferrier (112) agree that Malfred “hardly quali-
fies as an artist” since she fails to “take advantage of the assets of the 
New Vision” to recuperate whatever may be lurking in the depths of 
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our overshadowed histories (Delrez, “Eye of the Storm” 137), my aim 
in this essay is to demonstrate that her blockage, or her inability to ‘see’ 
with this New View, is by no means final. To do this, it will be neces-
sary to depart from the traditional definition of the New View (i.e. the 
idea that art is a means of conquering the real), which I attempt by 
dint of a comparison with one of Frame’s earliest texts, the short story 
entitled “The Birds Began to Sing.” The principles uncovered in the 
text connect to Frame’s interest in eastern philosophies, which, in turn, 
informs my reading of A State of Siege. Working under the assumption 
that Frame became acquainted with Buddhism prior to writing “The 
Birds”—that is, when she was a student at university1—and with the 
knowledge that, while at university, she studied C.G. Jung extensively 
(Frame, An Autobiography 174), one may safely assume that she was 
curious enough to read the Tibetan Book of the Dead for herself at some 
point. Indeed, Jung prized the book sufficiently to declare that, “from 
the year of its appearance onward, the Bardo has been my constant com-
panion” (qtd. in Conze 222).2 In effect, an examination of the different 
after-death planes traversed by Malfred in A State of Siege highlight the 
proximity of Frame’s post-mortem poetics with that which is central to 
Tibetan Buddhism, a comparison which makes it possible not to claim 
that Frame was a Buddhist—there are also points of divergence between 
the New Zealand writer and the Buddhist standpoint—but to invest 
positive significance in Malfred’s endorsement of the condition of self-
lessness characterizing a stone being.
Prefiguring A State of Siege with respect to its concern with art and 
perception, nature and the appropriation thereof, “The Birds Began to 
Sing” (collected in The Lagoon and Other Stories) stages an encounter 
between twenty-four singing blackbirds and a narrator intent on iden-
tifying the birds’ song: “What are you singing all day and night, in the 
sun and the dark and the rain, and in the wind that turns the tops of the 
trees silver?” (Frame 157). The woman’s inability to recognize the song 
is curious, to say the least, since the nursery rhyme after which the tale 
is named is surely part and parcel of her cultural baggage. Nevertheless, 
the birds blatantly ignore the narrator who, as a result, has no choice 
but to strain every fibre of her being in order to identify the song: “And 
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I listened,” she says, “I listened with my head and my eyes and my brain 
and my hands. With my body” (158). What she concludes from her 
intense listening is that “the birds began to sing” (158). It is strange that 
her eyes rather than ears should be called upon in this renewed endeav-
our to name the melody chirped by the birds. At any rate, it would be 
a mistake to consider that the narrator’s failure to recognize the song 
derives from an inability to reconnect with sensual experience, for both 
her mind and her body have been subordinated to the task of categoriz-
ing the world. That this is in fact rather symptomatic of the narrator’s 
general approach to experience is conveyed when, for a short while, she 
turns her back on the birds and takes a stroll: 
in the rain over the hills[,] .  .  . through swamps full of red 
water, and down gullies covered in snowberries, and then up 
gullies again, with snow grass growing there, and speargrass, 
and over creeks near flax and tussock and manuka. 
I saw a pine tree on top of a hill.
I saw a skylark dipping and rising. . . . 
I stood on a hill and looked and looked.
I wasn’t singing. I tried to sing but I couldn’t think of the song. 
(157)
Interestingly, it is not through any grass that she treads when she walks 
up and down the gullies but through snowgrass and speargrass or, when 
she nears a stream, through flax, tussocks, and manuka. The narrator 
provides the exact name of every single strand of grass, animal, or tree 
she comes across, a cognitive reflex which is made apposite to the block-
age of all recognitions. 
The more the narrator attempts to code the world with names and 
labels, the more it eludes her, as though reality were unfathomable 
within the ambit of conventional knowledge. Frame herself, then, con-
curs with Buddhism that “wordiness and intellection - /the more with 
them, the further astray we go [from the suchness of the real]” (qtd. in 
Conze 172). This is to say, in other words, that the author gestures to-
wards a realm of existence that is unadulterated by what may be loosely 
termed empirical or symbolic knowledge—which indicates, quite im-
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portantly, that her poetics contains fewer affinities with postmodernism 
than has been suspected. Indeed, even though it is perhaps the case that 
Frame sees subjectivity to be a result of language when it deploys itself 
in the realm of the symbolic, she also appears to suggest that to lose 
the kind of language that functions as an exclusionary shape is to begin 
to exist. While, as Tessa Barringer suggests, similarities exist between 
Frame’s a-symbolic real and the semiotics in Julia Kristeva’s theories 
(Barringer 71), it can never be sufficiently emphasized that, for Frame, 
the a-symbolic is nothing less than the principle upon which the im-
mensity of space and the infinity of time are constructed.3 Hence, the 
interdependence of aims between an ‘unframing’ or an ‘un-harnessing’ 
of the world and the author’s condemnation of the symbolic, as we will 
see, informs Frame’s thinking well beyond her first published volume. 
The “trimming of the view” (State 87) by the mind and senses that is 
central to “The Birds” is also a prime component of A State of Siege, in 
which the freshly retired art teacher moves to the island of Karemoana 
to paint her New View, only to decide that she is already “too tired, too 
middle-aged, dignified, to explore her past” and “what she had missed 
seeing by her dutiful habit of looking” (Frame, State 20). Such an ad-
mission of defeat may well be a sign that Malfred is content enough 
with an aesthetic that allows her to “ignore all irrelevant movement, 
color, form” (174), simplifying the picture to such an extent that her 
landscapes are stripped of any human presence. She is, however, not 
counting on the “touch of the agent that release[s] the prisoner into 
happiness—or new suffering, new prisons” (46) and that, in the guise of 
a prowler and of a storm (also called the Island’s ‘element’), will fissure 
and crack, one by one, all of her old defences. The first turning point 
in the text occurs when, one night, a storm breaks out on Karemoana, 
“hurling itself against the windows and the walls of the house” with such 
“an abandonment of screaming” (62) that Malfred’s mental barriers, as 
if they “were made of paper” (244), no longer seem solid enough to 
contain the world’s frightful fluidity:
The whole world lay without; within, there was nothing . . . ; 
the table flowed, the curtains hid nothing, were nothing. The 
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enormity of what lay outside began to touch Malfred with a 
cold brand that slid in a snail-track of sweat across her fore-
head. She listened intently. I must distinguish the sound of 
the sea, she thought. I must make something rational, eternal, 
from this animal screaming. (63)
Malfred’s confrontation with the “insubstantiability of the visible and 
tangible” (62) brings to mind Zoe in Edge of the Alphabet where, when 
her life is “sucked at last in the whirlpool” (Frame, Edge 107) by a kiss 
that is “beyond reason” (109), “beyond meaning” (90) and “unidenti-
fied” (170), she endeavours to “recapture a shape, pin, hook, net, the 
milling ocean” (107). Malfred’s experience also recalls Vera Glace’s exer-
tions in Scented Gardens for the Blind in which, prefiguring her counter-
part in A State of Siege, she discovers that objects swoop and dance once 
they are “free from the supervision of human eyes” as though it were 
“only the fact of being seen which keeps them in their places” (Frame, 
Scented Gardens 15). This sort of Weltanschauung may be informed by 
the author’s interest in Buddhism, for one of the prime components of 
the philosophy is indeed the conviction that less of the world is per-
ceived when the mind, via the supervision of the eye, immobilizes ex-
perience in an empirical net made of abstractions and symbols, whereas 
reality is “the water which slips through” whatever container we design 
(Watts 45). On a more familiar level, the working of the “ungrasping 
mind” might be compared to our peripheral vision, which registers all 
that is within eyeshot but which “works most effectively” when we are 
“not trying to see” (19). If rational knowledge is the favoured mind-
torch of the numerous individuals who, in the fashion of lighthouse 
keepers or miners, make “their own seeing, in their own light” (State 
165), Malfred’s (or Vera’s or Zoe’s) search for imagination must neces-
sarily be spurred by an impulse to discard all those exclusionary shapes 
which encourage the perception that reality is a collection of things and 
selves that happen or are outside ourselves.
This reading confirms, in retrospect, the continuity of concern linking 
A State of Siege to “The Birds Began to Sing,” for, after all, it is the nar-
rator’s endeavour to make a rational shape out of the animals’ chirping 
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which, in the short story, compromises her ability to recognize a reality 
that, on a deeper level of awareness, she already knows. It is not just, how-
ever, that the wealth of manipulated memories and selective perceptions 
that go hand in glove with symbolic knowledge induce a comforting 
blindness and a soothing amnesia. Subtending the reliance on symbolic 
knowledge is indeed a craving for conquest and control, an agenda that 
the narrator in “The Birds” discloses when she pleads that she is:
a human being and I read books and I hear music and I like to 
see things in prints. I like to see vivace andante words by music 
by performed by written for. Tell me and I will write it and you 
can listen at my window when I get the finest musicians in the 
country to play it, and you will feel so nice to hear your song so 
tell me the name. They stopped singing. It was dark outside al-
though the sun was shining. It was dark and there was no more 
singing. (Frame 158)
Dumbfounded by human arrogance, the birds fall silent, thereby con-
tradicting their remark that “we are singing and we have just begun, and 
we’ve a long way to sing and we can’t stop, we’ve got to go on and on. 
Singing” (157). Just as the narrator divulges her wish to dispossess the 
birds of their song, darkness suddenly engulfs the world, conveying—
albeit only obliquely—the extent of the tale’s distrust of the symbolic.
That, more often than not, the transfer operated by human beings of 
the nonconceptual to the symbolic amounts to an appropriation of the 
most unethical sort, is conveyed more relentlessly in A State of Siege than 
in any other text by Frame. Before retiring (or dying), Malfred witnesses 
with contempt her fellow non-indigenous New Zealanders’ mounting 
desire to be adopted by their country. Taken together, the Pakehas’ at-
tempts to apprehend the “soul of [their] own country” (Frame, State 
122) and the narrator’s continuing failure in “The Birds” to understand 
the birds’ song intimate that to try and appropriate reality is to lose it, 
as though the segments that are extracted with human symbolic chisels 
are no more significant than scraps of knowledge deprived of their con-
text. Herein lies an important gateway into Frame’s Buddhist-inspired 
epistemology inasmuch as the author’s interest in some undivided and 
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un-appropriated real invites a comparison with “the room two inches 
behind the eye,” Frame’s metaphor for the imagination (Delrez, “Eye 
of the Storm” 139). Malfred claims that what “lay there, treasure or 
no treasure, did not belong to her, had not been captured by her and 
given a name. Perhaps it would never be captured and named” (9), and 
this metaphor is consonant also with the “white undiscovered silence” 
in Edge (97) or with the Maniototo, the central image in Living in the 
Maniototo, which has been identified by critics such as Janet Wilson 
(631–49) as the artist’s abode and depicted by the narrator as an “un-
touched, undescribed, almost unknown plain” (Frame, Maniototo 43). 
The Maniototo, the undiscovered silence, the “room two inches behind 
the eye,” and the secret store are metaphors for the imagination, but 
they also correspond to a realm of existence that is not simplified by 
symbols and definitions. Frame’s favoured images, in other words, all 
point to the nonconceptual.
To represent the world in paintings and in poems, one can infer 
from the novel, it is best not to operate any exclusionary transfer to 
the symbolic. However contradictory it may sound, since art tends to 
be construed as a process of symbolization, this simply means, in A 
State of Siege as in Buddhism, that the artist must retain no sense of 
apartness from what she or he paints or lyricises (Watts 185), which 
is why she or he must become akin to an empty shape. This is hardly 
what Malfred achieves when, in her paroxystic fear of the enormity that 
lies outside, trying to get in, she gropes for paper and paint-brush to 
fix the flux within a framed frame, “a kind of double-capture, a View 
within a View, double burning, a double definition” (Frame, State 174), 
acting on the rationale that “paint preserves, maintains, seals, is a de-
fence you can never do without” (102). Ironically, the art teacher’s fail-
ure to paint imaginatively is inversely proportional to her inexperienced 
pupil’s ability to do so, one whose talent, Malfred remembers guiltily, 
she dismissed out of pure envy. Reminiscing about the episode, Malfred 
still cannot quite comprehend how a “mindless sponge” (123) such as 
Lettice Bradley had failed to absorb her teacher’s academic precepts. The 
episode is worth emphasizing because Lettice’s peculiar knowledge of 
the world is set in clear contradistinction to that of most other Pakeha 
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New Zealanders who grope for a similar access to the land’s “secret 
store” (122) and source of “imaginative abundance” (122), which they 
are denied as they also desire to “stake a claim in the identity of the 
country” (124). Conversely, it is my contention that Lettice derives her 
superior recognitions from a relationship to experience that is unmedi-
ated by concepts. However, in order to understand this, some light must 
first be shed on Malfred’s treatment of her sister Lucy, whom she views 
as another “mindless sponge.”
Unlike her sister, Lucy was never praised for her academic achieve-
ment, nor did she have Malfred’s sense of proportion; in fact, Lucy could 
never “understand the elbowing tyranny of triangles” (113). The sense of 
superiority Malfred continues to derive from this is qualified somewhat 
by her recollection that Lucy “knows people; perhaps the extent of her 
knowing can be summed up thus: she can bring a plumber from nowhere 
to plumb on a public holiday” (211). Far from signaling the collapse 
of Malfred’s rational self, her statement must be related to the fictive 
phone calls she makes to a doctor and a priest on the night the prowler 
and the storm test her sense of hospitality beyond all endurable limits. 
Eventually, she decides that no one will answer her call, not because the 
telephone is disconnected but because “the members of various profes-
sions have their provinces and must keep to them; they mustn’t trespass” 
(145). Thus, quite in line with her preference for objects that are im-
mobilized by a certain kind of seeing, she finds that people, too, should 
keep to their assigned places and this is why, when the past knocks at the 
door in the guise of her former fiancé, she “address[es] the man primly 
in [her] best Mind Your Shading manner” and blurts out, refusing him 
entry, “I, too, have my province” (208).
 The conviction she had expressed earlier that “understanding’s a sub-
ject to be studied, to be trained in, like shading” (98), leaves little doubt 
that the academic method of double definition, or symbolic knowledge, 
constitutes the ontological provincialism which entrenches dualisms 
and which Lucy and Lettice have outgrown. Theirs, in other words, is 
the Weltanschauung of the indiscriminate individual whose mind, in the 
Buddhist tradition, is said to work as a mirror insofar as it receives all 
but keeps nothing, so that it is neither able to select nor to appropri-
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ate (Watts 142). In this context, Malfred’s conclusion that the “vacant 
spaces in Lucy’s mind” are “inclined to spread like weed on a stagnant 
pond [and] such weed can be eliminated with method” (Frame, State 
211), must be seen as preposterous in the extreme, for it is precisely be-
cause Lucy and Lettice are uncluttered by symbols that they are able to 
accommodate, sponge-like (that is, in the fashion of empty shapes), the 
world’s unfathomed complexities; hence, they know with the “Biblical 
force of the word” (122). 
Although she bemoans the fact that, unlike Lettice’s, “none of her 
painting [has] ever described the way in which the plains submitted, 
a world without walls .  .  . to the invasion of light and air and snow-
colored water” (21), Malfred finds it no contradiction to construe her 
change of vision (or lack thereof ) as:
a cunning means of escaping from inevitable change by taking 
the responsibility of change upon herself. Not I am dying but 
I die; not I am born, but I bear, not that I am seen . . . but I 
see, I see. The habit of passive living, of submitting dutifully to 
the imposition of each day, has turned upon itself. I think that I, 
too, snarl at morning. There is blood beneath my fingernails, 
too, as I tear the flesh of the killed beast. (40, emphasis added)
From a feminist perspective of the kind adopted by Susan Ash, the pros-
pect of a woman regaining agency is good news, though the intimation 
that violence or a form of ontological cannibalism lies at the heart of 
active living casts some doubt on the validity of this reading. Elsewhere 
the text posits that the enemy of “the invasion of the mind” is “habit, 
routine, inertia” (Frame, State 50), which indicates, curiously enough, 
that self-world dualism, as well as active living or the refusal to submit to 
the world, is tantamount to a state of inertia. In yet another attempt to 
prompt Malfred’s stationary consciousness to budge an inch or so from 
her conceptual prison, the island’s agent suddenly immerses Malfred’s 
house and self into the flood of the undivided real. Momentarily reced-
ing into the background, the roaring winds besieging the house make 
way for the dominion of silence that reigns in the eye of a storm:
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It was first silence, emerging from emptiness, from nothingness 
.  .  . ; a tyrannical, cunning silence subject to change because 
it had the essence of knowing that all attributes and objects 
change, it simply could not be caught out in its perfection. 
It did not bring fear or pleasure or wonder; it brought itself. 
Malfred .  .  . [could not] exclaim in the uproar: “it is Sound! 
Silence is but a facet of sound.” She had learned to beware of 
the telescopic, fashionable, so-called poetic thinking that calls 
the beginning the end the end the beginning, that marries op-
posites in order to unite them and decrease the effort to under-
stand their separate natures. Surely, there was never any such 
silence on earth or in the sky, and if there had been no one 
had been willing to recognize it. . . . There was an obsession of 
man to prove that everything uttered had language, patterns of 
sounds. (160–61)
Beyond the usual provinces of the human mind and the rarely muffled 
sound of definitions, first silence emerges from the emptiness not of 
absence but of some utter fluidity in which nothing has a separate es-
sence and, therefore, can be taken away. Malfred, albeit against her will, 
comes face to face with the void, “the Alogical, to which no categories 
drawn from the world of name and form apply” (Woodroffe lxxi) and 
in which silence, once distinguished from sound, is simply meaningless. 
Importantly, the passage suggests that the a-symbolic is ever-present in 
the midst of people’s lives but is concealed behind the “patterns of sound 
made by the brain” (State 162). Similarly, “The Birds Began to Sing” 
intimates that the unmediated real lies directly under the narrator’s feet 
yet she cannot touch it, persuaded as she is that, to borrow a Buddhist 
image, the measure (i.e. the definition or empirical container) is the 
world that is being measured (Watts 41). The implications of this idea 
are numerous, especially in view of the current debate among critics 
about the nature of the real in Frame’s texts and of her conception of 
what Delrez terms a “utopian reality” (Manifold Utopia 124). 
First, insofar as the a-symbolic real is simply a fuller version of its sym-
bolic counterpart where “nothing [is] left behind . . . /nothing retained” 
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(Conze 174), it is possible to infer that Frame’s “beyond” lies within 
this reality and therefore does not constitute a transcendental sphere 
of existence. Thus, without wishing to contradict Simone Drichel’s ac-
curate perception that Frame, in the fashion of Emmanuel Levinas, 
considers that “the infinite, like the other, cannot be ‘compromised’—
grasped and contained” (199), I suggest that, in Frame’s conception, 
the infinite needs not be transcendental in order to remain uncorrupted 
by “the narcissistic subject” (Drichel 198), by the self who systemati-
cally reduces the Other to the selfsame. Indeed, while Levinas envisions 
human egotism as an irremediable given, Frame, and Buddhism for that 
matter, maintains that it is possible for the subject to dissolve her or his 
ego or discriminating consciousness. Because a true encounter with the 
infinite and the other is seen less as a utopian beyond than an urgent 
necessity, the New Zealand author, perhaps unlike the philosopher, op-
erates a radical revalidation of the profane. From this standpoint, it can 
therefore be claimed that, when Malfred dismisses the non-dual as wish-
ful poetic thinking, she disowns the infinite, the other and an impulse 
that, in fine, is deeply ethical. Yet, undeceived by the inadequacy of 
her response, Malfred intuits that “there was some action she should 
have taken while she had been alone in the silence; there was something 
she ought to have done, she could not think what it might have been” 
(Frame, State 162). In all likelihood, the missing step would have pre-
cipitated the deceased consciousness down the symbolic cliff, into the 
void of the nonconceptual.
The proximity that exists between the passage on “first silence” and 
the individual’s encounter with the Clear Light in the Tibetan Book of 
the Dead is truly remarkable and deserves closer scrutiny. According to 
Tibetan Buddhism, all deceased momentarily enjoy:
A condition of balance, or perfect equilibrium, and of oneness 
[in the realm of the Clear Light]. Owing to unfamiliarity with 
such a state, which is an ecstatic state of non-ego, of sublimi-
nal consciousness, the consciousness-principle of the average 
human being lacks the power to function in it; karmic propen-
sities becloud the consciousness principle with thoughts of per-
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sonality, of individualized being, of dualism, and, losing equi-
librium, the consciousness-principle falls away from the Clear 
Light. (Evans-Wentz 97)
“From that radiance,” the text proposes, “the natural sound of Reality, 
reverberating like a thousand thunders simultaneously sounding, will 
come” (Evans-Wentz 104). Hence, when silence first dawns upon 
Malfred, she too hears sounds that are unadulterated by any human 
sense of selective perception. To push the point further, it is worth 
signalling that the path followed by the deceased along the different 
bardo planes or after-death states in the Tibetan Book of the Dead cor-
responds, for the most part, with Malfred’s post-mortem peregrina-
tions in A State of Siege. Unaware that it has probed beyond life, the 
deceased consciousness in Tibetan Buddhism is typically under the 
delusion that it still possesses a body: “Life immediately after death” is 
“similar to, and a continuation of, the life preceding it” (Woodrooffe 
lxxiv). From the standpoint of its uncanny intertext, the narrative plot 
in A State of Siege may not, as Delrez fears, contradict his conviction 
that Malfred is dead at the onset of the novel (Delrez, “Eye of the 
Storm” 130), for the island of Karemoana is perhaps nothing other 
than Malfred’s mental construction, a rock she clings to in the eye of 
the storm.4 
Thus wallowing in their own ingrained inadequacies, the freshly de-
ceased in The Tibetan Book of the Dead and, arguably, in A State of Siege, 
are neither able to realise that they have crossed over to the other side of 
life, nor can they recognise the Clear Light (first silence) when it shines 
through the opacity of human habits of thought. Unacknowledged, the 
Clear Light retreats below the conceptual horizon of the deceased; this 
marks the termination of the first, or superior, bardo plane, in which 
“man is liberated but does not know it” (Woodrooffe lxxii). Functioning 
as a purgatory of sorts, the next bardo plane foregrounds the advent 
of karmic illusions which, not unlike dreams, are “entirely dependent 
upon [the individual’s] mental content” (Evans-Wentz 34). In Tibetan 
Buddhism, the state of consciousness in the second bardo is known as 
the “dream-state” (34), which ties in with the allusions in A State of Siege 
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that Malfred’s unsuccessful encounter with first silence prompts her to 
further quest for the New View in “the dream-room,” a chessboard-like 
chamber whose golden squares are doors to different memories (Frame, 
State 182), entered into upon falling asleep while, outside, the storm is 
far from abating.
At the end of her tether, Malfred first uses the dream-room as a refuge 
to nurse her separateness and, subsequently, to recover her old dual 
mode of being. On a subliminal level, this may be a further hint that the 
island of Karemoana itself is a primary dream-room, since she envisions 
it as the epitome of geographical apartness. In the next dream-room, 
her old hunger for trimmed vistas and people-free landscapes is still just 
about unquenched. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Malfred bars her family 
and lover from entry into her new sanctuary, persuaded as she is that 
they have robbed, and may still rob, parts of an essence she would like 
to see “framed, view within a view” (177, cf. 174). “There can never be 
an amputation of me” (189), she maintains, realizing only dimly that, 
to recuperate the aspects of her self that have been claimed by others, 
she will need something like an “extracting machine” (180). Once again, 
though, the resurfacing of such monstrous egotism is nipped in the bud 
by an ‘agent’:
All is well, [she deems,] dream-room philosophy, cripple to 
dancer, dumb to eloquent, though I was never dumb, suits me 
well until suddenly I am struck a blow that sends me leaping 
to my feet, running to the door (it is locked now) and crying 
“Help, Help”. . . . I realize that in my dream-room two inches 
behind the eyes there are no shadows. No shadows! But every-
thing has shadows, always: objects, people, plants, little dogs, 
plaits, uncles have shadows, their moustaches have shadows 
. . . , even the dead have shadows—surely? (182–83)5
The mounting anxiety she feels in the face of the shadowless objects 
scattered in the room, together with the denial that such shadowless-
ness may be the condition of the dead, provides a hint that she has been 
shocked into an awareness that she has been severed from her “physical 
body” by the “high surgery of death” (Woodrooffe lxxvi). This, in turn, 
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is in keeping with the notion expounded in the Tibetan Book of the Dead 
that, no longer able to deny that they are “neither reflected in a mirror 
nor [cast] a shadow,” the dead finally understand, when on the second 
bardo plane, that which they took to be their “physical body” is but a 
“dream body” (Woodroffe lxxvi), a ghostly illusion.
It is typical of Frame’s recuperative approach to the past that the 
‘karmic illusions’ that begin to clutter the dream-room almost the in-
stant Malfred is struck a blow by the agent should take the guise of those 
memories which she has tended to shun but which are now “unfolding 
without hindrance” (Frame, State 175). In this context, it is interest-
ing to note that Malfred’s relatives embody the resurfacing of repressed 
memories as they materialize in the dream-room. I argue that determin-
ing the category of beings to which these apparitions belong is crucial 
for venturing a reconsideration of post-mortem possibilities in Frame’s 
text. Although the Tibetan Book of the Dead insists that visions of gods 
and demons on the second bardo planes are karmic illusions, it neverthe-
less implies that entities “of like nature, being those of similar constitu-
tion [or level of knowledge] in the intermediate state, will individually 
see each other” (160, brackets in orig.). That Malfred is only able to 
interact with her mother while her other relatives remain distant may 
imply that mother and daughter are on the same after-death plane. It 
may well be, then, that the remaining members of the family belong to 
other categories of being either because they are still alive or, in the case 
of her dead father, because they have found a way out of or around this 
purgatory. Indeed, Malfred’s father evolves in what the text identifies as 
“the area of universal belonging where the known arithmetic does not 
work, where division is not division, but what it is [his daughter] can’t 
explain or find out” (State 186). Now aligned to the new arithmetic, Mr. 
Signal “has distributed himself about the room” (186) to such an extent 
that no extracting machine could ever succeed in re-assembling the 
fragments of his identity that he has scattered outside himself. In other 
words, it could be argued that Mr. Signal has become an empty shape 
or embraced an ontology which corresponds to none of the “catego-
ries drawn from the world of name and form” (Woodroffe lxxi), which 
means, crucially, that both Malfred’s “first silence” and Mr. Signal’s “area 
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of universal belonging” are akin to the Buddhist void, a locus that I call 
the non-conceptual.
To push the point further, it is interesting to note that, contrary to her 
husband, Mrs. Signal is the quintessence of the “predatory” individual 
who would “seize, snap up any individuality from any object she chanced 
to see” (Frame, State 195). Her obsession with recovering her shadow, 
and so, her essence, since “Man without his shadow . . . is robbed of his 
essence” (196), marks her as an unlikely candidate for immersion into 
the area of universal belonging. Indeed, still clinging to the view that 
one’s identity should never rest in “another person, age or place” (186) 
and that, as she puts it, “I am nothing but what I am . . . belongs to me” 
(196), she exits her daughter’s “windowless, sunless, shadowless room 
into her windowless, sunless, shadowless state of death” (202). Critics 
have understood Malfred’s insistence that “I am there always. There can 
never be an amputation of me” (189) as evidence that she belongs to the 
same category of being as her father and that “this is the closest [she] will 
ever get to a post-individualistic conception of the human person, with 
the possibilities of survival it implies” (Delrez, Manifold Utopia 147). 
On the contrary, I would like to argue that, at this particular point in 
the novel, Malfred is unable to exist outside herself. This is important to 
underline for, otherwise, one may have the impression that it is possible 
to endorse a non-dual condition of being while resisting the very idea 
of dissolution. It is in this sense that my reading of Frame departs from 
Delrez’s. Within Delrez’s reading of the text, a recognition of a world 
without walls (and of otherness) does not necessarily trigger a dissolu-
tion in the world so that, for instance, Malfred is able to acknowledge 
her past (the “internalized” other) while keeping the prowler (the other 
outside) at bay (Delrez, Manifold Utopia 3). This is, to some extent, true, 
yet the opposition drawn between Mr. Signal and his wife or daugh-
ter, or between Malfred and Lettice or Lucy, confirms the idea that, in 
order to know the world and absorb, sponge-like, its complexities, one 
must relinquish all agency or control over one’s identity and knowing. 
Significantly, such a non-dual condition of being is at once the inform-
ing principle subtending the area of universal belonging and the state of 
consciousness which Lettice and Lucy, though they are not dead, adopt. 
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Thus it becomes apparent that Frame’s alternative epistemology depends 
on the notion that authentic memory, knowledge, perception, or art is 
impossible so long as the subjective distinction between the knower and 
the known is upheld and so long as one remains at a distance from the 
area of universal belonging.
To return to Malfred’s dissolution, she distances herself from the old 
arithmetic when, in the dream-room, she realizes that painting affec-
tive landscapes is “an act of courage” (Frame, State 207) because “the 
condition of loving is that one withholds nothing, not even a scrap of 
identity” (206–07). At this liminal moment, first silence resurfaces from 
below the deceased’s conceptual horizon, transforming the “noise of 
living” (162) and the clatter of definitions into a “final nothingness” 
(233), but, this time, Malfred is prepared to welcome “the natural sound 
of Reality” (Evans-Wentz 104). Nonetheless, the text sustains a sense 
that she will cease hovering between her cannibal identity and a more 
creative selflessness only on the condition that she glimpses what lies 
outside the dream-room. Safe and snug in the antechamber of con-
sciousness, she must yet come face to face with the “dream world” of 
which “the insistence on being other than where one is” (Frame, State 
240) is the informing principle. That Malfred must leave her dream-
room behind is why, outside, the storm continues to rage and why, to 
her surprise, the prowler resumes its knocking, more inquisitive than 
ever. However, she again recoils from the prospect of utter selflessness 
and harks back instead to her god-like presumptions of power. Trying 
“to cast spells over the world to bend it to [her] will” (237), she erupts: 
“Why cannot I be left in peace in communion with the mountains?” 
(240). The agenda behind such a brand of romanticism is close to that 
of settlers trying to find their way to the secret store of their land; in 
both cases, the underlying intention is to stake a claim in the real so as to 
bend it to one’s own purposes. To break free from “her prison two inches 
behind the eye” (40), Malfred must abandon the impulse to assimilate 
elements from the natural world while retaining enough of her iden-
tity (or agency) to control them. Again, this suggests that, for Frame, a 
genuine communion with the world only occurs when it is no longer 
possible to seize scraps of an individual’s identity that do not belong to 
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another person, age, or place; and, again, the agent or island’s element 
proves instrumental in prompting such a transfer of being:
Always, death, the past, the future, are on guard ready to thrust 
meaning into the smallest gap in the simplicity; somewhere, 
the domestic conventional armor wears thin. As Malfred stared 
at the window, there was a crash, a splintering of glass flying 
in all directions.  .  .  . The wind, waiting at the window, leapt 
through the ragged gap, flapping wildly at the curtains; and, in 
a moment, the storm had entered the room. . . . Dazed, won-
dering what had broken the window, Malfred looked around 
the room. Beneath the window sill she saw a stone wrapped in 
newspaper. (243–44)
That the stone gathers around its core all the complexities of Frame’s 
poetics of dissolution is made apparent through Malfred’s inability to 
identify it: “She wanted it to be a river stone but she knew it was not, 
she could not name it” (245). She who had always been so intent on 
passing judgments on others (212) realizes an instant before undergoing 
the agent’s finishing touch that the smallest counterpart of her beloved 
mountains—or stones—are much more “accomplished in their being” 
(241) than she has ever been: “how unhurried in their movements; 
stones in their lives are slow travelers with no history of judgment or 
making comparisons. Still they could, if they wanted, tell tall tales of 
moss, desperation in burning, murder” (241). Exactly like “the room 
two inches behind the eye,” the stone cannot name and capture (that 
is, appropriate); nor can it be “captured or named” (9). It may well be, 
then, that what Malfred holds in the palm of her hand is no less than 
the dream-world, the secret store, the Maniototo or, simply, the a-sym-
bolic real. Therefore, when the stone loses “its chill and [grows] warm 
with promise of sun” (246), one gets the sense that Malfred’s deceased 
consciousness has withdrawn from “her windowless, sunless, shadowless 
state of death” (202) and found a place to be.
If nothing else, I have sought in this essay to bring into relief the im-
portance of the a-symbolic order of the real, which it is no paradox to 
locate within and beyond life, for if the text is articulated around a quest 
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for imagination, and if the secret store of the land is a source of imagi-
native abundance, the destination of Malfred’s deceased consciousness 
is precisely this secret, undescribed, almost unknown that plain Janet 
Frame calls elsewhere the Maniototo. Cardinal to this reading is the 
awareness that Malfred’s move from the dream-room to the dream-world 
marks the termination of her quest (or makes her become acquainted 
with the third and final bardo plane), for what this emphasizes, in an 
important sense, is the impossibility of observing the world from a van-
tage point that is external to it. This not only explains why any attempt 
at appropriating and dividing the real condemns the self to a reduction 
of creative possibilities, but it also hints that identity is an obstacle to 
sight and vision. Indeed, Mrs. Signal’s assertion that what she is belongs 
to her, together with her husband’s ability to apprehend a higher order 
of being precisely because his essence, so to speak, is located outside 
himself where he has no more control over it, marks one of many inti-
mations that what is under siege in the novel is Malfred’s discriminating 
consciousness. To uncover Frame’s concern with the dissolution of dual 
modes of thought is to shed an unprecedented light on the author’s 
vision of art, perception, and memory, as well perhaps as her alternative 
epistemology, for she relentlessly suggests that, to know the world, the 
knower must retain “nothing, not even a scrap of identity” (207) from 
which she or he tries to perceive. The relinquishing of agency, the differ-
ent after-death planes traversed by Malfred, and the intertextual echoes 
that thread together the Clear Light in The Tibetan Book of the Dead and 
the “first silence” that emerges “from emptiness, from nothingness” in A 
State of Siege (160–61) point to a convergence between Frame’s fiction 
and Buddhism, so that it becomes possible to venture that the survival 
of the individuated self is but a transitory state before the merging of the 
knower with the known, for in the Clear Light, “the experience and the 
thing experienced are inseparably one and the same” (Evans-Wentz 96). 
Nothing in A State of Siege, then, justifies Ash’s claim that “Frame per-
petuates the myth of the artist as an elite, isolate being” (186). Malfred 
may at first cherish the romantic desire for a boundless expansion of 
the human ego, but her endeavour is undermined by the agent, the 
avatar(s), perhaps, of the natural. Despite her profound attachment to 
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nature, Frame hardly comes across as a naïve inheritor of the European 
romantic tradition, which she re-shapes on the grounds of a growing 
awareness that communion equals appropriation when it occurs under 
the supremacy of a discriminating consciousness. At a deeper level of 
interpretation, this reading may allow a reconsideration of the views 
of the text as a “record of an imaginative failure,” wherein a lone artist 
proves unable to “load her memory with ‘an assortment of people cling-
ing one to the other’” (Delrez, “Eye of the Storm” 167). If, as I argue, 
Malfred no longer knows herself apart from the world by the end of 
the narrative, and if the subjective distinction between the knower and 
the known at last disintegrates, then arguably Malfred has gained access 
to the undivided real where all identities (living or dead) that are usu-
ally suppressed are allowed to exist, not as individuated entities but as 
uncluttered selves able to accommodate, or carry, other times, persons 
or places. Although it may be the case that the dissolution of the self 
into the real is necessarily bound up with a post-individualist vision of 
identity, the creative and ethical potential associated with transcending 
the symbolic is truly extraordinary. Thus, even when Frame considers 
the after-life in her fiction, she does so under the banner of creativity.
Notes
 1  The idea that Frame became interested in Buddhism as a university student has 
been confirmed by her niece and literary executor Pamela Gordon. See our cor-
respondence on “Janet Frame and Buddhism”; posted May 19, 2010, on Janet 
on the Planet. Web. 5 Sep. 2010. For further information on the topic, see also 
my article “Janet Frame in East-West Encounters,” forthcoming in Journal of 
Postcolonial Writing.
 2  “Bar-do literally means ‘between’ (Bar) two (do), i.e. ‘between two states’” 
(Evans-Wentz 28).
 3 See my article “The Fences of Being” in Commonwealth: Essays and Studies 33.2. 
 4  For a further examination of Frame’s use of places as “vehicles to enact her philo-
sophical concerns” (Cronin 86), see Cronin’s article.
 5  The “dream-room two inches behind the eyes” (State 182) and the “prison two 
inches behind the eyes” (40) should not be confused with the room two inches 
behind the eyes itself for, while the former rooms point to enclosed spaces and 
maintain the usual outside versus inside distinction, the latter, as has been sug-
gested, is part and parcel of a “world without walls” (21), so that it is at once 
outside and inside.
299
Jane t  Fr ame’s  V i s i on  o f  Se l f  and  Know l edge
Works Cited
Ash, Susan. “Janet Frame: The Female Artist as Hero.” Journal of New Zealand 
Literature 6 (1988): 170–89. Print. 
Barringer, Tessa. “Powers of Speech and Silence.” Journal of New Zealand Literature 
11 (1993): 71–88. Print. 
Brown, Ruth. “A State of Siege: The Sociable Frame.” Journal of New Zealand 
Literature 11 (1993): 49–58. Print. 
Conze, Edward. Buddhist Scriptures. London: Penguin, 1959. Print. 
Cronin, Jan. “‘Encircling Tubes of Being’: New Zealand as Hypothetical Site in 
Janet Frame’s A State of Siege.” Journal of New Zealand Literature 23 (2005): 
79–91. Print. 
Dell Panny, Judith. I Have What I Gave: The Fiction of Janet Frame. Wellington: 
Daphne Brasell, 1992. Print. 
Delrez, Marc. Manifold Utopia: The Novels of Janet Frame. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2002. Print. 
——. “The Eye of the Storm: Vision and Survival in A State of Siege.” The Ring 
of Fire: Essays on Janet Frame. Ed. Jeanne Delbaere-Garant. Sydney: Dangaroo, 
1992. 126–39. Print.
Drichel, Simone. “‘Signposts to a World that is Not Even Mentioned’: Janet Frame’s 
Ethical Transcendence.” Frameworks: Contemporary Criticism on Janet Frame. 
Eds. Jan Cronin and Drichel. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009. 181–212. Print. 
Evans, Patrick. Janet Frame. Boston: Twayne, 1977. Print. 
Evans-Wentz, W.Y., ed. The Tibetan Book of the Dead: Or, the After-Death Experiences 
on the Bardo Plane, According to Lama Kazi Dawa-Samdup’s English Rendering, 
3rd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1957. Print. 
Ferrier, Carole. “The Rhetoric of Rejection: Janet Frame’s Recent Work.” South 
Pacific Images. Ed. Chris Tiffin. Brisbane: U of Queensland P, 1978. 196–203. 
Print. 
Frame, Janet. An Autobiography. 1989. New York: George Braziller, 1991. Print. 
——. Living in the Maniototo. London: The Women’s Press, 1979. Print. 
——. A State of Siege. New York: George Braziller, 1966. Print. 
——. Scented Gardens for the Blind. New York: George Braziller, 1963. Print. 
——. The Edge of the Alphabet. New York: George Braziller, 1961. Print. 
——. The Lagoon and Other Stories. London: Bloomsbury, 1951. Print. 
Mercer, Gina. Janet Frame: Subversive Fictions. Dunedin: U of Otago P, 1994. Print. 
Watts, Alan. The Way of Zen. New York: Random House, 1957. Print. 
Wilson, Janet. “The Inner World: Living in Frame’s Maniototo.” Routes of the Roots: 
Geography and Literature in the English-Speaking Countries. Ed. Isabella Maria 
Zoppi. Rome: Bulzoni, 1999. 631–49. Print. 
Woodroffe, Sir John. Foreword. The Tibetan Book of the Dead or the After-Death 
Experiences on the Bardo Plane, According to Lama Kazi Dawa-Samdup’s English 
Rendering. Ed. W.Y Evans-Wentz. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1957. Print.
